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Undervaluation, Private Information, Agency Costs and the 
Decision to Go Private 
Abstract 
There is widespread anecdotal evidence that poor stock market performance is 
an important reason for taking a company private. Our results support the 
perceived undervaluation hypothesis. The finding also applies to management 
buy-outs, which indicates that the management of these firms had private 
information. We also find that firms going private had non-optimal governance 
structures, higher board and institutional ownership. The last finding is consistent 
with going private transactions providing institutions with a means of exiting firms 
with poor market valuation, particularly during a time of very limited pressure 
from the market for corporate control. 
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Undervaluation, Private Information, Agency Costs and the 
Decision to Go Private 
I Introduction 
The market for corporate control has traditionally been viewed as an important  
mechanism for acquiring under-valued corporations, changing their ownership 
and governance and subsequently improving performance. The development of 
leveraged buy-outs (LBOs) in the 1980s in the US was viewed as an important 
development of the market for corporate control.  LBOs introduced a novel 
mechanism for acquiring listed companies with agency problems and replacing 
them with more effective governance structures. These public to private (PTP) 
transactions involved the taking private of listed corporations and the 
replacement of public monitoring by private monitoring based on leverage, 
concentrated ownership and active financial investors.  
 
The UK experienced a significant increase in the number and value of public-to-
private transactions during the late 1990s. During the period 1990-1997, some 37 
PTPs took place whereas during the period 1998-2000, there were 116 PTPs.  
The average value of each deal was £29.78 million for 1990-1997 and £142.30 
million for 1998-2000, which represents a 4.77 times increase in deal size.  
 
US studies analyzing the factors influencing the decision to go private using data 
from the 1980s have primarily investigated the impact of free cash flow and 
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growth prospects on PTPs, for example, Lehn and Poulsen (1989), Kieschnick 
(1998). Other studies such as Kaplan (1989) concentrated on tax advantages 
and Halpern et al (1999) looked at board shareholdings and incentive effects.  
 
However, developments over the last two decades suggest that these arguments 
may provide incomplete explanations of public to private activity. In this context, 
this paper extends previous research relating to firms going private in four ways. 
First, there is a great deal of anecdotal evidence that the latest wave of PTPs is 
driven by the management’s perception that the stock market undervalues their 
company. This suggests that the rationale for going private may have changed.  
However, this perception has not been analysed. We investigate the relevance of 
undervaluation and contrast a measure that may reflect perceived undervaluation 
by management with that of an objective measure of undervaluation. This 
provides an insight into the extent of private information possessed by the 
management teams of firms that go private.  
 
Second, since the 1980s concerns about corporate malpractice have led to 
increased emphasis on enhancing internal corporate governance through the 
adoption of corporate governance codes that, inter alia, recommended important 
changes to the operation of boards of directors. The UK in particular has been 
innovative in introducing corporate governance codes. We therefore look at the 
role of corporate governance mechanisms in the post-Cadbury period given that 
reports such as Cadbury (1992) and Hampel (1998) set out clear guidelines on 
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the matter of corporate governance with a Code of Best Practice identifying 
recommended internal governance structures. We evaluate the extent to which 
firms going private may experience higher agency costs because of ineffective 
governance structures.  
 
Third, since the 1980s, hostile takeovers have become quite rare. This applied to 
both the US, for example, North (2001) and to the UK, for example, Weir and 
Laing (2003). If firms going private are poor stock market performers and there is 
not an active market for corporate control, the decision to go private may 
represent an important means for an institution to exit such a company.  
 
Fourth, we analyse the impact of differentiating between types of PTP. The 
sample is split into management buy-outs (MBOs) and non-MBOs in terms of 
undervaluation, agency costs and ownership. This distinction is potentially 
important because the current management team is likely to remain in post after 
an MBO whereas a non-MBO involves outside management taking over. 
 
We find evidence that, using a measure of perceived undervaluation, firms going 
private do perform worse on the stock market than firms that remain public. 
Although the objective measure of valuation also produces support for the 
undervaluation hypothesis, the result is statistically weaker. This suggests that 
the management of firms going private possess private information that leads 
them to believe that the market undervalues their companies. If the time period is 
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extended to three years before going private, perceived undervaluation remains 
highly significant but the objective measure becomes insignificant. 
 
We find that institutional shareholders have significantly higher shareholdings in 
firms going private This, combined with the undervaluation results, suggests that 
going private provides institutions with a means of exiting undervalued 
companies. In addition it was found that, governance factors explain the 
likelihood of being taken private. Firms going private are more likely to have 
internal governance mechanisms that do not conform to those recommended in 
the UK’s Code of Best Practice.  
 
We also find that board shareholdings are significantly higher in firms going 
private and these firms were not more likely to experience hostile interest than 
firms remaining public. This suggests that there was no pressure from the market 
for corporate control. In terms of the traditional arguments, we find no evidence 
that firms going private have more free cash flow, lower growth prospects or are 
likely to lower tax payments.  
 
We also find that MBOs are significantly undervalued according to the perceived 
measure but are not according to the more accurate objective measure. There is 
evidence that non-MBOs experienced lower perceived valuations but not lower 
actual undervaluation. The results therefore similar to those of MBOs but suggest 
that, in the case of non-MBOs, management does not have private information 
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that leads them to believe that the market is wrong. However, it does show that 
outside buyers value the companies differently.  
 
We also find that prior to going private, MBOs have non-optimal board structures, 
particularly in terms of a greater incidence of duality. MBOs also have higher 
institutional shareholdings, which, given the lack of alternative buyers, suggests 
that institutions would be willing to agree to the bid to take the company private. 
Further, the higher board shareholdings suggest that the directors would not only 
maintain control but also gain a financial windfall from the premium paid. In terms 
of non-MBOs, we also find non-optimal board structures and higher shareholding 
values.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the various 
reasons for going private and the determinants of the sale process. Section III 
describes the data and sets out the variable definitions. Section IV sets out the 
methods of analysis and presents the results. Finally some conclusions are 
drawn. 
 
II Literature Review and Hypotheses 
One of the key reasons for going public is to make it easier to raise capital and to 
increase the profile of the company (Treasury, 1998). However, there are a 
number of reasons why this may not occur. First, many firms that go private are 
relatively small. For example, in our sample of firms that went private, 97% had a 
market capitalisation of less than £300 million. The average value of deals was 
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£49.5 million in 1998 and £116.44 million in 2000. In the UK, an analysis of 
smaller quoted companies showed that the smaller company index tended to be 
low relative to the All Share Index (Treasury, 1998). This makes it harder for 
firms to issue equity and hence increases their cost of capital. Relatively low 
equity prices also make companies unattractive to institutional shareholders and 
fund managers. The lack of interest in such shares means that they are likely to 
remain lowly valued which provides an impetus to go private.  
 
Second, small firms often experience a degree of illiquidity in their stock. For 
example, they are often ignored by fund managers who tend to deal in 
substantial blocks of capital and so would find it inefficient to spend time and 
effort in buying smaller blocks of small firms (CMBOR, 1999).  
 
Third, if institutions attempt to sell shares in firms that experience thin trading, it 
is likely to have a noticeable effect on the share price which will reduce the value 
of any remaining holdings. This lack of buyers makes it harder for these 
companies to use the equity market to fund expansion, which in turn raises 
questions about the actual benefits of being a publicly quoted company. Given 
that there are significant costs associated with being quoted, for example, 
additional accounting and audit expenditures and listing costs, going private 
appears to be an attractive proposition. 
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As a consequence, the  nature of the share price performance brings with it the 
management perception that, given its financial performance, the market 
undervalues the company. Management is faced with a choice, take the 
company private or remain quoted and be likely to continue to be undervalued in 
the management’s eyes. This will result in probable wealth decreases as 
shareholdings fall in value.  
 
The issue of perceived undervaluation by the management has received little 
academic attention One early US study, Maupin et al (1984), surveyed senior 
management of ex-quoted firms and used factor analysis to identify the 
characteristics of firms going private. One of the significant reasons for going 
private was that the market valuation of the company, measured by the price-
earnings ratio, did not reflect the management’s perception of its true value.  
 
In the UK, evidence for perceived undervaluation, and its importance in the 
decision to go private, tends to be anecdotal. For example, the chairman of 
Denby complained of a low price earnings ratio (Financial Times, 1999); the 
chairman of Norbain argued that the low share price meant that it would be 
easier to compete by going private (Financial Times, 1999); and the chairman of 
Goodhead stated that, being a small company, there was no institutional interest 
in it (Daily Telegraph, 2000). Further examples include the chief executive of 
Allied Textiles stating that the market was not reflecting the intrinsic value of the 
company (Financial Times 2000) and the chairman of Ward, a building firm, 
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claimed that the housing boom had not been reflected in the company’s share 
price.   
 
These examples clearly show that the decision to go private was driven by a 
perception that the market had not accurately valued the companies in terms of 
their share prices. An important theme running through the comments made 
about the perceived undervaluation is that it had occurred over a period of time 
and was expected to persist. Undervaluation may therefore be defined in terms 
of the deterioration of the company’s share price relative to firms remaining 
public. This will therefore hamper management’s ability to use the expected 
benefits available to quoted companies. Its main consequence is the very limited 
access to the funds required to finance either expansion or acquisitions. 
Remaining public therefore imposes severe restrictions on a company’s ability to 
compete. This would be consistent with the management of firms going private 
possessing private information that indicates that the firm is undervalued relative 
to the market’s view. Thus: 
 
H1a: firms that are perceived to be undervalued are more likely to go private 
 
However, it may be that by concentrating too closely on share price performance 
as a measure of company value, management was ignoring alternative, more 
objective valuation measures, for example, enterprise value (see data section). 
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This provides a broader measure of company worth by including cash and debt 
in addition to market capitalisation.  For consistency, we hypothesise that: 
H1b: firms that are actually undervalued are more likely to go private 
 
The second explanation for going private relates to shareholder wealth effects. 
Studies have shown that a bid announcement increases the share price of the 
firms going private. For example, DeAngelo et al (1984), Marais et al (1989) and 
Lee et al (2001) all reporting significant premiums being paid to the shareholders 
of firms that went private.  Existing shareholders will only sell if offered more than 
the current market price for their shares and hence there is a financial incentive 
to accept a bid. Evidence of higher board shareholdings in firms going private 
was found by Maupin (1987) and Halpern et al (1999). This reasoning may also 
apply to institutional shareholdings.  As discussed above, smaller companies 
may experience thin trading and little share price movement. This lack of market 
activity will make any offer, with its premium element, an attractive proposition to 
an institution. This will be particularly welcome if the institution is locked into an 
undervalued company. The second hypothesis therefore is: 
H2: firms with higher board and external shareholdings are more likely to go 
private.  
An alternative explanation is that firms going private suffer from high agency 
costs, Jensen (1986) and Lehn and Poulsen (1989). One source of high agency 
costs is the existence of ineffective internal governance mechanisms, something 
that has been the subject of much debate in the UK where quoted companies 
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must include a governance report in their annual accounts. The basis for the 
report is the Combined Code of Best Practice (Hampel, 1998), a development of 
the Cadbury Code of Best Practice (Cadbury, 1992). There is no legal 
requirement for companies to adopt the Code but it does lay out the rationale 
behind the governance structures that are regarded as best practice, and hence 
are expected to improve accountability, increase transparency and so reduce 
agency costs.  
The internal mechanisms identified in the Code deal with two key areas, board 
structure and the presence of committees, in particular audit and remuneration 
committees. In the UK audit and remuneration committees are present in around 
95% of quoted companies (Weir and Laing, 2000; Dahya et al., 2002). Given 
their near total adoption, it was decided to omit them from the analysis. The 
paper therefore focuses on the issue of board structure and defines internal 
governance mechanisms in terms of non-executive director representation and 
the presence of duality. The latter occurs when one person combines the posts 
of CEO and chairman.  
The key concern about duality is that it affords one person too much of a 
powerbase and offers an increased locus of control (Morck et al., 1987). These 
reduce the board’s ability to monitor and check the actions of the CEO. Duality 
should therefore be linked to poor performance. However, there is evidence that 
duality does not adversely affect performance (Baliga et al., 1996; Weir et al., 
2002).  
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Further, the role of governance in take-overs is usually analysed in terms of 
hostile acquisitions (for example, Shivdasani, 1993; O’Sullivan and Wong, 1999). 
As discussed above, in recent years in the UK, acquisitions of publicly quoted 
companies have been mainly non-hostile (Weir and Laing, 2003). Going private 
transactions tend to involve a non-contested change of organisational structure 
hence the impact of duality may be less clear-cut. In addition, as shown above, 
firms going private tend to be relatively small and the Combined Code recognises 
that smaller firms may neither need nor be able to afford a separate chairman. 
This raises further questions about the role of internal governance mechanisms 
and the extent to which they ensure that the board pursues shareholder interests. 
Non-executive directors represent an effective means of monitoring the actions of 
the executive directors (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and hence reduce 
managerial discretion. By ensuring wealth maximising policies, non-executive 
directors play an important part in the reduction of agency costs.  In addition, 
non-executive directors may bring other advantages such as expert knowledge to 
the company (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
The Code stresses the importance of non-executive directors in terms of their 
relative representation on the board. It is proposed that a significant presence will 
be achieved if there are at least three non-executive directors on the board. It 
therefore identifies an absolute number of non-executives rather than a relative 
number in relation to effective monitoring. 
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Although most studies include variables such as duality and non-executive 
director representation as separate variables, it is of interest to assess how far a 
company adopts both of these key recommended governance structures. We 
therefore construct hypotheses based on the combined adoption of the 
recommended governance structures as well as their individual adoption. Thus: 
H3a: companies that do not adopt the recommended governance structures are 
more likely to go private.  
H3b: companies that have duality are more likely to go private 
H3c: companies with fewer non-executive directors are more likely to go private. 
 
In the US, firms going private in the 1980s were more likely to experience hostile 
takeover interest than firms that remained public (Lehn and Poulsen, 1989; 
Halpern, et al., 1999). Hence the market for corporate control appeared to act as 
an effective realignment mechanism in the US. Consistent with this, and, 
notwithstanding the fact that, in the UK, during the 1990s there has not been an 
active hostile take-over market we propose:  
 
H4: firms going private are more likely to experience take-over interest than firms 
that remain public. 
 
We also address elements related to the more traditional explanations for going 
private, free cash flow and growth,  and tax savings. First, free cash flows are 
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cash balances in excess of what is required to fund projects with positive net 
present values (Jensen, 1986). Firms with high free cash flows therefore incur 
high agency costs because the funds could be returned to shareholders in the 
form of higher dividends or used to repurchase stock, which again increases 
returns to shareholders.  
 
Evidence about the role of free cash flow in the decision to go private is mixed. 
Lehn and Poulsen (1989) find evidence that firms going private had higher free 
cash flows whereas Opler and Titman (1993) and  Halpern et al. (1999) reported 
an insignificant relationship. However, consistent with the Jensen (1986) 
proposition, we hypothesise that: 
 
H5: firms with high free cash flows are more likely to go private. 
 
Second, Jensen’s argument about the importance of free cash flow is also linked 
to growth opportunities (Jensen, 1986). Firms with substantial free cash but low 
growth opportunities may spend the cash on negative net present value projects 
because there are limited opportunities for profitable investment within the firm’s 
areas of operation. A number of studies have used different measures of growth 
opportunities. For example sales growth was found to be significantly lower for 
firms going private by Lehn and Poulsen (1989). However, Opler and Titman 
(1993) and Halpern et al. (1999) find no evidence that Tobin’s Q is lower for firms 
going private. Consistent with Jensen’s hypothesis, we propose that: 
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H6: firms with lower growth prospects are more likely to go private.   
 
Third, in relation to potential tax advantages, Maupin (1987) found firms going 
private would benefit from significant tax savings generated from the increased 
depreciation write-offs. Another potential source of tax savings is from the 
increase in debt used to partly finance the deal (Kaplan, 1989).  More generally, 
Halpern et al. (1999) found that firms going private pay more tax than firms that 
remained publicly quoted.  Therefore: 
 
H7: firms going private pay more tax than firms that remain public. 
 
III Data and methodology 
We construct a sample of PTPs and a matched sample of firms that remained 
public using the same accounting date as the PTP. This allowed us to compare 
firms at the same point in time. The sample was matched by size and industry as 
classified by the Financial Times Industrial Classification. Matching samples have 
been used in numerous studies, for example, Lehn and Poulsen (1989), Song 
and Walkling (1993) and Weir and Laing (2003). 
 
Data were obtained for all non-financial public-to-private transactions during the 
period 1998-2000. The data included performance, ownership and governance 
details. Because the financial services sector is overseen by the Financial 
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Services Authority, the relationship between governance mechanisms and 
performance is not necessarily as it is for non-financial sector companies. As a 
result, only non-financial services are included in the sample. We also required 
companies to have at least two years of complete data. This gave us a working 
sample of 84 public-to-private transactions, the total number being 116.  
 
The names of firms going private were provided by the Centre for Management 
Buy-out Research (CMBOR), which is based at the University of Nottingham. 
Data relating to sales growth, tax, free cash flow and undervaluation were taken 
from Extel Company Analysis. Data relating to pressure from the market for 
corporate control were taken from Financial Times Intelligence. Data on board 
shareholdings and external shareholdings were taken from the 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers Corporate Register. Details of the bid premiums were 
taken from Acquisitions Monthly. The data relate to the situation at the 
publication of the last accounts before the PTP transaction occurred.  
 
Dependent variables 
The dependent variable used in tables 5 and 6 takes the value one if the 
company went private and zero if it remained public. For table 7 it is one if a 
company was involved in a PTP that was a management buy-out and zero if not 
and for table 8 it is one if the company was involved in a PTP that was a non-
management buy-out and zero if not. The dichotomous nature of the dependent 
variable means that using OLS will cause a number of problems. For example it 
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will produce residuals that are non-normally distributed and heteroscedastic. 
Therefore logistic regression is an appropriate technique to use:  
iZii e
ZFP  1
1)(  
where Pi is the probability that a company will be involved in a public-to-private 
transaction, e is the natural log and  
ii XZ   
where Xi is the matrix of explanatory variables. In the logistic model 

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where 1-Pi is the probability of remaining public and hence Zi is the log of the 
odds of going private. We report the logits.  
The main models estimated are: 
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Independent variables 
The independent variables used in the analysis are defined as follows.  
Value1 – is defined in two ways 
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(i) it is a measure of the management’s perceived undervaluation (PU1). It is the 
ratio of the market capitalisation of a company at point t divided by its market 
capitalisation in t-1. Point t is the date of the last accounts before the 
announcement of the PTP for both the company going private and its match and 
t-1 relates to the previous year. The perceived undervaluation hypothesis 
therefore expects firms going private to be undervalued relative to firms 
remaining public. 
 
(ii) We also use enterprise value (EV1) as the objective measure of valuation. It 
is defined as market capitalisation plus debt minus cash. As above, the extent of 
undervaluation is measured by the ratio of enterprise value in period t to its value 
in t-1. If PTPs are truly undervalued, we expect there to be a negative 
relationship between it and the probability of going private. Thus 
Thus 0
1

i
i
Value
Z

  
We also include a second measure, Value2, which also has two definitions: 
(i) PU2 is defined as market capitalisation in period t divided by market 
capitalisation in t-2. This provides a longer-term perspective on the direction of 
the management’s perceived undervaluation.  
(ii) EV2 is enterprise value in t divided by enterprise value in t-2.  
Both will have a negative relationship with going private.  
Thus 0
2

i
i
Value
Z

  
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Brdvalue – is the value, in millions of pounds, of the board’s shareholding. This 
measures potential wealth effects of remaining public. For firms of the same size, 
we would not expect any difference in the value of shareholdings. However, if 
undervaluation is present, we would expect the value of board shareholdings to 
be lower for PTPs. The value of shareholdings also indicates that there may be a 
financial incentive to go private and hence negative wealth effects if remaining 
public. 
 Thus 0
i
i
Brdvalue
Z

  
Brdshare – is the percentage of the firm’s equity held by the board. It also 
measures the financial incentives associated with going private because the 
greater the shareholding, the greater the gains from any premium received. Thus 
0
i
i
Brdshare
Z

  
 
Extshare – is the total shareholdings of institutions that have at least a 3% 
holding. All externally held shareholdings in excess of 3% must be made public. 
The higher the shareholdings,  the greater the financial incentives to accept the 
decision to go private. Thus 0
i
i
Extshare
Z

  
CC – is a measure of compliance with the Combined Code of Best Practice. It is 
a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a company has at least three non-
executive directors and has a separate CEO and chairman and zero if not. 
Compliance should represent good governance and effective internal monitoring. 
 21
However, given the expected presence of high agency costs, firms going private 
are less likely to comply with the Code. Therefore 0
i
i
CC
Z

  
Duality – is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the posts of CEO and 
chairman are combined and zero if they are separated. We expect firms going 
private to be more likely to combine the posts. Therefore 0
i
i
Duality
Z

  
NX – is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if there are at least three non-
executive directors on the board and zero otherwise. We expect firms going 
private to have fewer non-executive directors. Therefore 0
i
i
NX
Z

  
Threat – measures the pressure from the market for corporate control. Halpern et 
al. (1999) measured take-over interest in terms of the reporting of a significant 
interest or if an actual bid had been made. Following this approach, we use a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if there had been a failed hostile bid or a 
proxy fight in the period from one month before the PTP was announced to 
eighteen months before and zero if not. This provides a clear measure of how far 
the incumbent management faced actual pressure from the market for corporate 
control. If the company suffered from poor management we would expect there 
to be more interest in buying companies that went private than for those 
remaining public. Therefore 0
i
i
Threat
Z

  
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We also introduce a number of variables to control for more traditional 
explanations of going private: 
Free cash flow – is the three-year average percentage free cash flow deflated by 
sales. Free cash is defined as operating cash flow minus interest, taxes and 
dividends. We expect there to be a positive relationship between free cash flow 
and the decision to go private. Thus 0
i
i
owFreecashfl
Z

  
SalesG – is the three-year average percentage change in sales. It measures 
growth prospects (Kieschnick, 1998). We expect firms going private to have 
lower growth prospects than firms remaining public. Thus 0
i
i
SalesG
Z

  
Tax – is the three-year average tax paid deflated by sales converted to a 
percentage. The tax paid is taken from the cash flow statement. If the rationale 
was to gain tax advantages from the increased debt, we would expect firms 
going private to pay more in tax than firms remaining public (Kaplan, 1989). Thus 
0
i
i
Tax
Z

  
IV Results 
IVa Whole sample 
INSERT TABLE 1 
Table 1 provides an overview of the sample’s characteristics. The perceived 
valuation measures, PU1 and PU2, show that market values rose over the period 
by 7% and 23% respectively whereas the true valuation measures, EV1 and EV2 
rose 14% and 27%. The mean value of board shareholdings was £7.47 million 
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and the average board shareholding was 15.27%. External shareholdings held 
by institutions had a mean value of 30.21%, which means that large institutional 
shareholders held twice as many shares as the board. In terms of adopting the 
Combined Code of Best Practice recommendations, 49% had at least 3 non-
executive directors and a separate chairman and CEO. Thus over half had not 
adopted both of the key governance structures in the Code. Breaking it down, 
23% had a dual CEO-chairman and the average proportion of firms with at least 
three non-executive directors was 0.59. In terms of the numbers on non-
executive directors, 57% had at least three. Average free cash flows were 5.09% 
of sales and the average tax paid 1.70% of sales. On average 2% of the sample 
experienced hostile take-over interest. 
INSERT TABLE 2 
Table 2 reports the univariate analysis. There is evidence that firms going private 
experienced falling market capitalisation whereas those remaining public had 
rising market valuations, with PU1 being 0.92 and 1.23 respectively. The 
differences for PU1 and PU2 are both significant at the 5% level which offers 
support for the perceived undervaluation argument. The objective valuation 
measures, EV1 and EV2, also show signs that firms going private were being 
valued more lowly than firms remaining public. Boards hold significantly more 
shares in firms that went private but there is no difference in the value of their 
shareholdings. We also find that institutions had higher shareholdings in firms 
going private. 
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The governance variables show that 44% of firms going private had adopted the 
Combined Code’s recommended board structures with 54% of firms remaining 
public doing so. The difference was not significant. Firms involved in PTPs had a 
significantly higher incidence of duality than firms remaining public, 30% against 
16%. No difference was found in the proportion with at least non-executive 
directors on the board. Thus governance differences appear to be driven by the 
attitude towards duality. 
 
Interestingly in relation to traditional explanations, the univariate analysis also 
finds no significant differences between the two samples of firms in terms of free 
cash flows, sales growth, tax paid, or the extent to which the firms experienced a 
hostile take-over interest.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 
Table 3 reports the correlation matrix for the independent variables. High 
correlations indicate the possibility of multicollinearity which means that variables 
should not be included in the same equation. Table 3 shows high correlations 
between PU1, PU2 and EV1 and EV2. There is also a high correlation between 
PU1 and EV1. There are also high correlations between CC and NX and Duality. 
Accordingly, these variables were included in separate equations in the results 
reported in subsequent tables. 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 
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Table 4 provides some additional insights into the undervaluation hypothesis. 
Undervaluation, measured by PU1 and EV1, was split into quintiles for each of 
the samples. In terms of perceived undervaluation, the chi square shows that 
there is a significant difference, at the 5% level, in the proportions of PTPs and 
non-PTPs in the different quintiles. The table shows, for example, that PTPs 
make up 54.5% of firms in the quintile measuring the greatest loss of value and 
only 27.3% in the highest quintile. Non-PTPs were 45.5% and 72.7% 
respectively. PTPs also constituted 67.6% of the firms in the second lowest 
quintile. These results therefore provide support for the management’s 
perception that firms going private are valued more lowly than those remaining 
public, even when size is accounted for. However, if EV1 is used, no statistical 
difference is found between the percentages of firms in the different percentiles.  
INSERT TABLE 5 
The initial logistic regression results are given in Table 5. They show that both 
undervaluation measures are negative and significant in all models indicating that 
firms involved in PTPs suffer market value deterioration relative to firms that 
remain public. The results are statistically stronger for the perceived measure of 
undervaluation. They also show that the boards of firms going private had 
significantly higher shareholdings at 1%. However, the variable measuring the 
value of shareholdings is not significantly different which suggests that the 
market’s undervaluation had direct wealth effects on the boards of firms that went 
private because the higher shareholdings are not being translated into greater 
wealth. Externally held shareholdings were also significantly higher for firms 
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going private.  The insignificant market for corporate control variable, THREAT, 
means that there is unlikely to be alternative buyers waiting to make a bid.  
 
We find that CC is negative and significant in two of the four equations in which it 
appears. Thus firms going private are less likely than their matched counterparts 
to have adopted the Code’s recommendations about duality and non-executive 
director representation. As the table shows, the result is being driven by the fact 
that firms going private are more likely to have duality rather than by the lack of 
non-executive directors. Thus they are more likely to have non-optimal 
governance structures. 
 
There is no evidence that UK firms went private to gain tax advantages. Neither 
do we find that firms going private suffer from either higher free cash flows or 
lower growth opportunities than firms remaining public.  
INSERT TABLE 6 
The extent of potential undervaluation was further explored by replacing PU1 
with PU2 and EV1 with EV2. These measure how far valuation has changed over 
the previous two years. This gives an additional time lag to the analysis, 
something that could provide valuable additional insights into the undervaluation 
issue. If significant, this would illustrate a longer-term undervaluation of firms 
going private relative to similar sized firms in the same industry. The longer 
intertemporal movement was significant and negative in all four models that used 
perceived undervaluation. This suggests that the market had been moving 
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against the firms that went private for a number of years. However, there is no 
difference in the enterprise value measure. This implies that, given publicly 
available information, the market does not undervalue firms that go private over a 
longer time period. The other key results remain the same.  
 
Thus, we find support for the perception that on average, relative to firms of the 
same size, in the same industry, firms going private had seen their valuations fall. 
However, using enterprise value, there is no evidence of undervaluation. This 
raises the possibility that the management teams of firms that went private have 
private information that led them to believe that the stock price should be higher.  
 
A number of additional tests were undertaken to assess the robustness of the 
results. First, we included a measure of accounting performance, the three-year 
average return on assets. It was insignificant, suggesting that firms going private 
were not poor performers. Second, the Hampel Report, Hampel (1998) proposed 
that non-executive directors should make up at least one third issue of the board. 
A dummy variable was constructed that had the value one if at least one third of 
a board was non-executive directors and zero if not. It was found to be 
insignificant. Thus the results indicate that duality was the key governance 
difference between the samples. It may be that even though the Code indicates 
that small firms may not necessarily separate the posts, it may represent a 
situation in which dominant founders are still in control, the market still viewed its 
presence with suspicion 
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Third, we obtained details of the bid premium from Acquisitions Monthly for one 
day, and one month, prior to the announcement that the company was going 
private. The bid premium averaged 44% for the one day period and 46% for the 
month. Both were significantly different from zero. This indicates that not only  
were there significant wealth gains to be made by shareholders but also that the 
premium represents further evidence that the market had undervalued the 
companies.  
 
IVb Management buy-outs and non-management buy-outs  
The sample of firms going private was split into management buy-outs, n=59, 
and non-management buy-outs, n=25. There are a number of key differences 
between the two, the main one being that the current management drive an MBO 
and as such, are more likely to remain in post after the buy-out. In contrast non-
MBOs (typically management buy-ins, MBIs, or investor-led buy-outs, IBOs) 
involve an outside buyer and a probable change of management. Logistic 
regression was used on the samples with the company matches being used. The 
results are reported in Tables 7 and 8. 
 
Consistent with the private information argument, we expect that MBOs will be 
perceived by their management to be undervalued. This may also be reflected in 
the objective measure.  It is also expected that MBOs will have higher internal 
ownership than firms remaining public because it will increase the probability of 
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bid success. It would also mean that management would have a financial 
incentive to go private. We also expect MBOs to have governance structures that 
do not comply with the Code of Best Practice because the extent of their 
ownership offers them protection against the market from corporate control. We 
also expect less pressure from the market for corporate control because potential 
buyers will be put off by the existence of significant blocks of internal ownership, 
which may make a successful bid more difficult. Higher tax payments are also 
hypothesised. 
INSERT table 7 
The results show that MBOs were perceived to be undervalued, however, the 
result was mainly only weakly significant at the 10% level. Board ownership was 
significantly higher and there was some evidence that duality was more common. 
In terms of pressure from alternative buyers, the variable THREAT was omitted 
from this part of the analysis because its inclusion generated a singular matrix. 
However, given the small overall number of hostile bids that there was no 
pressure from external buyers and that the incumbent management did not face 
competition from outside buyers. In relation to free cash flow and growth 
opportunities, the results provide evidence that in the UK these factors do not 
affect management buy-outs. In terms of longer-term undervaluation, although 
not reported here, PU2 was significantly lower at 5% and EV2 was insignificant. 
In the case of MBOs, management decided to act upon the differences in 
perceived valuation, which suggests that they possessed private information. 
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Non-MBOs involve outside buyers and the probable replacement of the 
incumbent management. We therefore expect they will experience both 
perceived and actual undervaluation because they will be characterised by poor 
stock market performance. They will also have non-optimal governance 
structures. Board ownership will be lower which means that the management will 
be less able to resist an outside bid. In addition, we expect them to exhibit higher 
agency costs as a result of higher free cash flows and lower growth prospects. 
tax payments are also expected to be higher. 
 
INSERT table 8 
Most of the equations, five out of eight, for non-MBOs were statistically 
insignificant, including all of the EV1 equations. This again illustrates differences 
between the management’s perceptions and those of the market. In those 
models that were significant, we find that boards have higher shareholdings but 
external shareholdings are not significantly different. There is again evidence that 
duality is more likely to occur in a firm going private. At the time of the outside bid 
for the company, the value of board shareholdings in the targets was higher than 
that in firms remaining public. We also find that the EV2 measure of valuation 
was not different for non-MBOs. However, there was no move by management to 
buy the company. This suggests that the management had no private information 
that would lead them to buy the company. 
 
V. Conclusions  
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This paper has used a novel, hand collected dataset of PTP buy-outs completed 
in the late 1990s to extend understanding of buy-outs that has generally been 
based on studies carried out in the 1980s. In particular, the paper analyses the 
valuation, agency costs and ownership characteristics of firms going private and 
compared them with those of firms remaining public. We show that firms going 
private suffer from perceived undervaluation. This supports the anecdotal 
evidence that is available in the UK. If we use a more objective measure of 
valuation, enterprise value, there is also evidence of lower valuation, however, 
this does not hold if a longer period is used for comparison. We also find 
differences occur if the sample is split into MBOs and non-MBOs. For MBOs and 
non-MBOs, once again, perceived undervaluation is lower but the objective value 
measure is not different. This is consistent with the management of firms going 
private by means of an MBO having private information that the market does not 
whereas this is not the case for non-MBOs. However, in the latter case, outside 
management believe that they can create value by taking the firm private.  
 
We also find evidence of higher agency costs being incurred by firms that went 
private. These take the form of non-optimal internal governance mechanisms, 
something present in all three sets of the analysis. Contrary to Lehn and Poulsen 
(1989), there is no evidence that pressure from the market for corporate control 
acts as an impetus to going private.  
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There is however, evidence of financial incentives to going private, particularly for 
MBOs, because of higher board ownership. In relation to institutions, given the 
insignificant enterprise valuation results, it does not appear that they are locked 
into poorly performing companies so that going private represents a way out. It 
appears that going private therefore represents a financial windfall to the 
institutions. 
 
Importantly, these findings differ from more traditional explanations for going 
private. We have shown that in the UK in the late 1990s low growth opportunities, 
higher free cash flows and higher tax payments, do not influence the decision to 
go private.  
 
Our results raise a number of additional research questions. First, the importance 
of undervaluation has been shown to be dependent on the way in which it is 
defined. It would be helpful to identify the reasons why management believed 
that the market was undervaluing their firms. Second, what factors influence non-
MBOs? These results refer to a relatively small number of non-MBOs and further 
analysis of a larger sample may offer useful insights.  Third, it has been shown 
that there is little evidence of an active public market for corporate control. 
However, it may be that there is an active private market in the sense that there 
is take-over activity, successful or otherwise, that is not made public. Boone and 
Mulherin (2003) have shown that in the US there is significant private competition 
for firms before the final public announcement of a single buyer. Thus the market 
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for corporate control appears not to influence changes in ownership but in fact it 
is played out behind the scenes rather than in public. It would be interesting to 
find out if this applied to the UK as well. 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics of the sample 
 
 Minimum Maximum Mean 
PU1 0.19 11.71 1.07 
PU2 0.15 17.02 1.23 
EV1 0.10 12.13 1.14 
EV2 0.12 14.32 1.27 
Brdval (£m) 0.02 198.22 7.47 
Brdsh (%) 0.01 75.31 15.27 
CC 0 1 0.49 
NX  0 1 0.59 
Duality 0 1 0.23 
Free cash flow 
(%) 
-44.13 45.43 5.09 
Tax  (%) -42.03 9.12 1.70 
SalesG (%) -26.29 279.76 19.62 
Extshare (%) 0 88.56 30.21 
Threat 0 1 0.02 
 
PU1 is the ratio of market capitalisation at year-end before going private to market capitalisation 
the previous year. PU2 is the ratio of market capitalisation at year-end before going private to 
market capitalisation two years previous. EV1 is the ratio of enterprise value (market 
capitalisation plus debt minus cash) at year end before going private to its value the previous 
year. EV2 is the ratio of enterprise value (market capitalisation plus debt minus cash) at the year-
end before going private to it value two years previous. Brdvalue is the value of the board’s 
shareholdings. Brdshare is the percentage of equity held by the board. Extshare is the total 
shareholdings of institutions. CC is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the company has at least 
three non-executive directors and no duality and zero otherwise. NX is a dummy variable that has 
the value 1 if the board has at least three non-executive directors on the board and zero 
otherwise. Duality is a dummy variable that has the value 1 if the posts of CEO and chairman are 
combined and zero if not. Free cash flow is the three year average percentage free cash flow 
divided by sales. Tax is the three year average tax paid deflated by sales. SalesG is the three 
year average percentage change in sales. Threat is a dummy variable that has the value 1if there 
had been a failed hostile bid or proxy fight in the period one month to eighteen months before the 
announcement of the PTP and zero if not. 
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Table 2 Univariate analysis of factors influencing the decision to go private 
 
 PTP Non PTP T statistic Z statistic 
PU1 0.92 1.23 2.15** 2.31** 
PU2 0.96 1.49 2.19** 2.16** 
EV1 0.95 1.34 2.09** 1.87* 
EV2 1.14 1.40 1.11 2.85*** 
Brdval (£m) 9.28 5.66 1.18 1.35 
Brdsh (%) 18.76 11.74 2.38** 2.03** 
CC 0.44 0.54 1.26 1.26 
NX  0.57 0.61 0.57 0.57 
Dual 0.30 0.16 2.52** 2.44** 
FCF (%) 5.07 5.10 0.02 0.21 
Tax (%) 1.92 1.48 0.73 0.21 
SalesG (%) 17.93 21.31 0.56 0.85 
Ext (%) 32.76 27.67 1.82* 1.55 
Threat 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 
 
*** - significant at 1%; ** - significant at 5%; * - significant at 10% 
z statistic refers to the paired Wilcoxon test. 
 
PU1 is the ratio of market capitalisation at year-end before going private to market capitalisation 
the previous year. PU2 is the ratio of market capitalisation at year-end before going private to 
market capitalisation two years previous. EV1 is the ratio of enterprise value (market 
capitalisation plus debt minus cash) at year end before going private to its value the previous 
year. EV2 is the ratio of enterprise value (market capitalisation plus debt minus cash) at the year-
end before going private to it value two years previous.  Brdvalue is the value of the board’s 
shareholdings. Brdshare is the percentage of equity held by the board. Extshare is the total 
shareholdings of institutions. CC is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the company has at least 
three non-executive directors and no duality and zero otherwise. NX is a dummy variable that has 
the value 1 if the board has at least three non-executive directors on the board and zero 
otherwise. Duality is a dummy variable that has the value 1 if the posts of CEO and chairman are 
combined and zero if not. Free cash flow is the three year average percentage free cash flow 
divided by sales. Tax is the three year average tax paid deflated by sales. SalesG is the three 
year average percentage change in sales. Threat is a dummy variable that has the value 1if there 
had been a failed hostile bid or proxy fight in the period one month to eighteen months before the 
announcement of the PTP and zero if not. 
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Table 3 Correlation Matrix 
 
 PU1 PU2 EV1 EV2 Brdv
al 
Brds
h 
CC NX Dual FCF TAX Sale
sG 
EXT Thre
at 
PU1 1.00              
PU2 0.47 1.00             
EV1 0.84 0.36 1.00            
EV2 0.80 0.59 0.80 1.00           
Brdv
al 
-0.01 0.06 -0.02 0.02 1.00          
Brds
h 
-0.04 0.08 -0.03 0.03 0.50 1.00         
CC -0.13 -0.13 -0.12 -0.20 0.00 -0.19 1.00        
NX -0.24 -0.14 -0.12 -015 -0.02 -0.26 0.77 1.00       
Dual 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.11 -0.56 -0.25 1.00      
FCF -0.11 -0.21 -0.08 -0.06 -0.06 0.17 -0.10 -0.08 0.05 1.00     
TAX -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 0.05 0.18 0.05 0.03 1.00    
Sale
sG 
0.00 0.03 0.01 0.16 0.16 -0.07 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.07 -0.37 1.00   
EXT -0.08 0.06 -0.12 -0.13 -0.13 -0.52 0.18 0.10 -0.10 -0.12 0.01 0.09 1.00  
Thre
at 
-0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.08 0.07 0.45 .015 0.24 1.00 
 
PU1 is the ratio of market capitalisation at year-end before going private to market capitalisation 
the previous year. PU2 is the ratio of market capitalisation at year-end before going private to 
market capitalisation two years previous. EV1 is the ratio of enterprise value (market 
capitalisation plus debt minus cash) at year end before going private to its value the previous 
year.  EV2 is the ratio of enterprise value (market capitalisation plus debt minus cash) at the year-
end before going private to it value two years previous. Brdvalue is the value of the board’s 
shareholdings. Brdshare is the percentage of equity held by the board. Extshare is the total 
shareholdings of institutions. CC is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the company has at least 
three non-executive directors and no duality and zero otherwise. NX is a dummy variable that has 
the value 1 if the board has at least three non-executive directors on the board and zero 
otherwise. Duality is a dummy variable that has the value 1 if the posts of CEO and chairman are 
combined and zero if not. Free cash flow is the three year average percentage free cash flow 
divided by sales. Tax is the three year average tax paid deflated by sales. SalesG is the three 
year average percentage change in sales. Threat is a dummy variable that has the value 1if there 
had been a failed hostile bid or proxy fight in the period one month to eighteen months before the 
announcement of the PTP and zero if not. 
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Table 4 Undervaluation by quintiles 
 
 Perceived Undervaluation Enterprise Value 
 PTP (%) Non-PTP (%) PTP (%) Non-PTP (%) 
1 54.5 
 
45.5 51.5 48.5 
2 67.6 
 
32.6 61.8 38.2 
3 44.1 
 
55.9 58.8 41.2 
4 55.9 
 
44.1 33.2 61.8 
5 27.3 
 
72.7 39.4 60.5 
Chi 
square  
 
 
 
12.26** 
  
6.33 
 
** - significant at 5% 
 
Perceived undervaluationis the ratio of market capitalisation at year-end before going private to 
market capitalisation the previous year.  Enterprise value is the ratio of enterprise value (market 
capitalisation plus debt minus cash) at year end before going private to its value the previous 
year. For the quintiles, 1 represents the lowest quintile, or the greatest loss of value and 5 
represents the highest quintile, or the highest gain in value. 
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Table 5 Logistic regression of factors affecting the decision to go private with 
undervaluation measured from one period before going private 
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
PU1 -1.0042 
(2.77)*** 
-0.9758 
(2.60)*** 
-1.0547 
(2.88)*** 
-1.0221 
92.71)*** 
    
EV1     -0.6754 
(1.98)** 
-0.6474 
(1.92)* 
-0.6897 
(1.93)* 
-0.6384 
(1.80)* 
Brdvalue 0.0210 
(1.43) 
 0.0252 
(1.49) 
 0.0182 
(1.36) 
0.0215 
(1.41) 
  
Brdshare  0.4271 
(3.55)*** 
 0.0446 
(3.60)*** 
  0.0424 
(3.51)*** 
0.0469 
(3.72)*** 
Extshare 0.0023 
(2.40)** 
0.0401 
(3.54)*** 
0.0251 
(2.61)*** 
0.0441 
(3.75)*** 
0.0188 
(2.07)** 
0.0214 
(2.27)** 
0.0374(3.
29)*** 
 
0.0421 
(3.54)*** 
 
Threat 0.2714 
(0.46) 
 
0.3422 
(0.57) 
0.6288 
(0.89) 
0.4678 
(0.78) 
-0.1263 
(0.11) 
0.7271 
(1.05) 
0.0519(0.
04) 
 
0.8969 
(1.27) 
 
Tax 0.0277 
(0.56) 
0.0478 
(0.98) 
0.0122 
(0.24) 
0.0324 
(0.65) 
0.0292 
(0.60) 
0.0113 
(0.23) 
0.0484 
(1.01) 
0.0292 
(0.59) 
SalesG -0.0023 
(0.52) 
-0.0019 
(0.43) 
-0.0031 
(0.70) 
-0.0033 
(0.71) 
-0.0012 
(0.28) 
-0.0026 
(0.60) 
-0.0009 
(0.22) 
-0.0026 
(0.57) 
Free cash 
flow 
-0.0096 
(0.44) 
-0.0071 
(0.30) 
-0.0148 
(0.67) 
-0.0117 
(0.51) 
-0.0078 
(0.36) 
-0.0140 
(0.64) 
-0.0061 
(0.26) 
-0.0141 
(0.62) 
CC -0.6927 
(2.05)** 
-0.4649 
(1.32) 
  -0.6113 
(1.86)* 
 -0.3713 
(1.08) 
 
Duality   1.1498 
(2.67)*** 
1.1231 
(2.49)** 
 1.0724 
(2.53)** 
 1.1139 
(2.51)** 
NX   -0.2563 
(0.72) 
-0.0017 
(0.14) 
 -0.1978 
(0.56) 
 0.1342 
(0.35) 
 
Constant 0.5790 
(1.11) 
-0.6801 
(1.02) 
0.1146 
(0.20) 
-1.1470 
(1.28) 
0.3390 
(0.64) 
-0.1780 
(0.31) 
-0.9033 
(1.34) 
-1.6463 
(2.49)** 
Chi square 19.72*** 30.63*** 24.70*** 36.14*** 16.26** 20.98** 27.54*** 33.96*** 
 
*** - significant at 1%; ** - significant at 5%; * - significant at 10% 
 
PU1 is the ratio of market capitalisation at year-end before going private to market capitalisation 
the previous year.EV1 is the ratio of enterprise value (market capitalisation plus debt minus cash) 
at year end before going private to its value the previous year. Brdvalue is the value of the 
board’s shareholdings. Brdshare is the percentage of equity held by the board. Extshare is the 
total shareholdings of institutions. CC is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the company has at 
least three non-executive directors and no duality and zero otherwise. NX is a dummy variable 
that has the value 1 if the board has at least three non-executive directors on the board and zero 
otherwise. Duality is a dummy variable that has the value 1 if the posts of CEO and chairman are 
combined and zero if not. Free cash flow is the three year average percentage free cash flow 
divided by sales. Tax is the three year average tax paid deflated by sales. SalesG is the three 
year average percentage change in sales. Threat is a dummy variable that has the value 1if there 
had been a failed hostile bid or proxy fight in the period one month to eighteen months before the 
announcement of the PTP bi and zero if not. 
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Table 6 Logistic regression of factors affecting the decision to go private with 
undervaluation measured from two periods before going private 
 
 
 Model 9 Model 10 Model 
11 
Model 
12 
Model 
13 
Model 
14 
Model 
15 
Model 
16 
PU2 -0.6333 
(2.52)** 
-0.5681 
(2.25)** 
-0.6414 
(2.50)** 
-0.5681 
(2.18)** 
    
EV2     -0.1971 
(1.28) 
-0.2138 
(1.41) 
-0.1629 
(1.05) 
-0.1773 
(1.16) 
Brdvalue 0.0261 
(1.60) 
 0.0308 
(1.68)* 
 0.0188 
(1.42) 
 0.0216 
(1.46) 
 
Brdshare  0.0493 
(3.88)*** 
 0.0540 
(4.07)*** 
 0.0448 
(3.68)*** 
 0.0494 
(3.87)*** 
Extshare 0.0221 
(2.34)** 
0.0441 
(3.67)*** 
0.0254 
(2.57)** 
0.0497 
(3.93)*** 
0.0188 
(2.06)** 
0.0382 
(3.35)*** 
0.0214 
(2.27)** 
0.0430 
(3.60)*** 
Threat 0.2393 
(0.41) 
0.3343 
(0.55) 
0.6490 
(0.91) 
0.8652 
(1.18) 
-0.0467 
(0.04) 
0.1404 
(0.12) 
0.7372 
(1.05) 
0.9295 
(1.30) 
Tax 0.0234 
(0.48) 
0.0460 
(0.93) 
0.0073 
(0.14) 
0.0270 
(0.54) 
0.0278 
(0.55) 
0.0480 
(0.96) 
0.0109 
(0.21) 
0.0297 
(0.59) 
SalesG -0.0018 
(0.39) 
-0.0012 
(0.26) 
-0.0021 
(0.46) 
-0.0026 
(0.55) 
-0.0005 
(0.11)- 
0.0003 
(0.01) 
-0.0020 
(0.44) 
-0.0016 
(0.35) 
Free cash 
flow 
-0.0158 
(0.70) 
-0.0161 
(0.66) 
-0.0219 
(0.97) 
-0.0231 
(0.97) 
0.0183 
(0.75) 
-0.0214 
(0.85) 
-0.0217 
(0.88) 
-0.0265 
(1.07) 
CC -0.7021 
(2.06)** 
-0.4323 
(1.20) 
  -0.6293 
(1.91)* 
-0.4004 
(1.15) 
  
Duality   1.1149 
(2.62)*** 
1.1671 
(2.61)*** 
  1.0059 
(2.47)** 
1.0525 
(2.46)** 
NX   -0.2727 
(0.76) 
0.1161 
(0.29) 
  -0.2409 
(0.69) 
0.0930 
(0.24) 
Constant 0.2632 
(0.54) 
-1.2255 
(1.88)* 
-0.2398 
(0.45) 
-1.9645 
(2.68)*** 
-0.0846 
(0.18) 
-1.3498 
(2.20)** 
-0.5977 
(1.17) 
-2.0828 
(3.00)*** 
Chi square 20.29*** 33.48*** 24.93*** 39.85*** 11.62 24.42*** 15.93* 30.42*** 
  
*** - significant at 1%; ** - significant at 5%; * - significant at 10% 
 
PU2 is the ratio of market capitalisation at year-end before going private to market capitalisation 
two years previous.  EV2 is the ratio of enterprise value (market capitalisation plus debt minus 
cash) at the year-end before going private to it value two years previous.  Brdvalue is the value of 
the board’s shareholdings. Brdshare is the percentage of equity held by the board. Brdrel is the 
value of board shareholdings at the year-end before going private divided by the value the year 
before. Extshare is the total shareholdings of institutions. CC is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
the company has at least three non-executive directors and no duality and zero otherwise. NX is 
a dummy variable that has the value 1 if the board has at least three non-executive directors on 
the board and zero otherwise. Duality is a dummy variable that has the value 1 if the posts of 
CEO and chairman are combined and zero if not. Free cash flow is the three year average 
percentage free cash flow divided by sales. Tax is the three year average tax paid deflated by 
sales. SalesG is the three year average percentage change in sales. Threat is a dummy variable 
that has the value 1if there had been a failed hostile bid or proxy fight in the period one month to 
eighteen months before the announcement of the PTP bi and zero if not. 
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Table 7 Logistic regression of factors affecting the decision to go private by 
means of a management buy-out 
 
 
 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 
20 
Model 
21 
Model 22 Model 
23 
Model 
24 
PU1 -0.6943 
(1.67)* 
-0.7449 
(1.96)* 
-0.7287 
(1.74)* 
-0.8071 
(2.10)** 
    
EV1     -0.5509 
(1.38) 
-0.5443 
(1.53) 
-0.5341 
(1.36) 
-0.5495 
(1.55) 
Brdshare 0.0598 
(3.78)*** 
 0.0608 
(3.78)*** 
 0.0600 
(3.77)*** 
 0.0615 
(3.79)*** 
 
Brdvalue  0.0168 
(1.23) 
 0.0195 
(1.22) 
 -0.1530 
(1.18) 
 0.0174 
(1.12) 
Extshare 0.0546 
(3.56)*** 
0.0243 
(2.14)** 
0.0577 
(3.68)*** 
0.0272 
(2.33)** 
0.0529 
(3.43)*** 
0.0217 
(1.92)* 
0.0558 
(3.54)*** 
0.0240 
(2.08)** 
Tax 0.0658 
(1.20) 
0.0388 
(0.70) 
0.0515 
(0.91) 
0.0267 
(0.47) 
0.0649 
(1.20) 
0.0372 
(0.68) 
0.0486 
(0.87) 
0.0232 
(0.42) 
SalesG -0.0012 
(0.24) 
-0.0016 
(0.35) 
-0.0023 
(.044) 
-0.0024 
(0.50) 
-0.0007 
(0.15) 
-0.0012 
(0.26) 
-0.0020 
(0.40) 
-0.0021 
(0.44) 
Free cash 
flow 
-0.0057 
(0.20) 
-0.0089 
(0.37) 
-0.0134 
(0.49) 
-0.0135 
(0.56) 
-0.0071 
(0.26) 
-0.0086 
(0.38) 
-0.0156 
(0.58) 
-0.0134 
(0.56) 
CC -0.4390 
(1.01) 
-0.6812 
(1.69)* 
  -0.3870 
(0.90) 
-0.6398 
(1.61) 
  
Duality   1.0165 
(1.89)* 
0.9811 
(1.97)* 
  1.0280 
(1.90)* 
0.9806 
(1.97)* 
NX   -0.0267 
(0.52) 
-0.3764 
(0.88) 
  -0.0850 
(0.18) 
-0.2637 
(0.62) 
Constant -1.6664 
(2.02)** 
0.3283 
(0.59) 
-2.1153 
(2.36)** 
-0.0046 
(0.01) 
-1.7659 
(2.14)** 
0.2074 
(0.37) 
-2.2943 
(2.55)*** 
-0.2009 
(0.33) 
Chi square 28.92*** 12.49* 32.04*** 15.71** 28.59*** 12.03* 31.74*** 14.69* 
 
*** - significant at 1%; ** - significant at 5%; * - significant at 10% 
 
PU1 is the ratio of market capitalisation at year-end before going private to market capitalisation 
two years previous. EV1 is the ratio of enterprise value (market capitalisation plus debt minus 
cash) at year end before going private to its value the previous year. Brdvalue is the value of the 
board’s shareholdings. Brdshare is the percentage of equity held by the board.  Extshare is the 
total shareholdings of institutions. CC is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the company has at 
least three non-executive directors and no duality and zero otherwise. NX is a dummy variable 
that has the value 1 if the board has at least three non-executive directors on the board and zero 
otherwise. Duality is a dummy variable that has the value 1 if the posts of CEO and chairman are 
combined and zero if not. Free cash flow is the three year average percentage free cash flow 
divided by sales. Tax is the three year average tax paid deflated by sales. SalesG is the three 
year average percentage change in sales.  
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Table 8 Logistic regression of factors affecting the decision to go private by 
means of a non-management buy-out 
 
 
 Model 25 Model 
26 
Model 27 Model 28 Model 
29 
Model 30 Model 
31 
Model 
32 
PU1 -3.1011 
(2.71)*** 
-3.8371 
(2.83)*** 
-3.2437 
(2.72)*** 
-3.7351 
(2.85)*** 
    
EV1     -1.6474 
(1.75)* 
-1.4400 
(1.51) 
-1.9543 
(1.96)* 
-1.7192 
(1.72)* 
Brdshare 0.0111 
(0.42) 
 0.0241 
(0.93) 
 0.0069 
(0.28) 
0.0142 
(0.59) 
  
Brdvalue  0.0663 
(1.72)* 
 0.0674 
(1.68)* 
  0.0456 
(1.29) 
0.0468 
(1.28) 
Extshare 0.0101 
(0.50) 
0.0199 
(1.00) 
0.0168 
(0.77) 
0.0227 
(1.06) 
0.0071 
(0.37) 
0.0139 
(0.67) 
0.0133 
(0.70) 
0.0177 
(0.88) 
Tax -0.3116 
(1.32) 
-0.4193 
(1.63) 
-0.3103 
(1.39) 
-0.3653 
(1.57) 
-0.1598 
(0.79) 
-0.1376 
(0.72) 
-0.2028 
(0.98) 
-0.1672 
(0.39) 
SalesG -0.0154 
(1.09) 
-0.0177 
(1.20) 
-0.0149 
(1.03) 
-0.0160 
(1.08) 
-0.0116 
(0.86) 
-0.0102 
(0.74) 
-0.0125 
(0.92) 
-0.0110 
(0.80) 
Free cash 
flow 
0.0248 
(0.38) 
0.0104 
(0.15) 
0.0351 
(0.53) 
0.0265 
(0.38) 
-0.1598 
(0.79) 
0.0228 
(0.40) 
0.0094 
(0.16) 
0.0177 
(0.30) 
CC -1.0925 
(1.46) 
-1.1429 
(1.50) 
  -0.8218 
(1.22) 
 -0.7656 
(1.17) 
 
Duality   1.6846 
(1.87)* 
1.6098 
(1.77)* 
 1.0821 
(1.33) 
 0.9691 
(1.18) 
NX   0.1026 
(0.13) 
-0.0178 
(0.02) 
 0.0076 
(0.01) 
 -0.0439 
(0.06) 
Constant 3.9943 
(1.98)* 
4.4757 
(2.07)** 
2.7244 
(1.32) 
3.1278 
(1.46) 
2.1860 
(1.23) 
0.8911 
(0.46) 
2.1956 
(1.24) 
1.0762 
(0.57) 
Chi square 11.96 15.08** 13.66* 16.13** 5.82 6.15 7.55 7.63 
 
*** - significant at 1%; ** - significant at 5%; * - significant at 10% 
 
PU1 is the ratio of market capitalisation at year-end before going private to market capitalisation 
two years previous. EV1 is the ratio of enterprise value (market capitalisation plus debt minus 
cash) at year end before going private to its value the previous year. Brdvalue is the value of the 
board’s shareholdings. Brdshare is the percentage of equity held by the board.  Extshare is the 
total shareholdings of institutions. CC is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the company has at 
least three non-executive directors and no duality and zero otherwise. NX is a dummy variable 
that has the value 1 if the board has at least three non-executive directors on the board and zero 
otherwise. Duality is a dummy variable that has the value 1 if the posts of CEO and chairman are 
combined and zero if not. Free cash flow is the three year average percentage free cash flow 
divided by sales. Tax is the three year average tax paid deflated by sales. SalesG is the three 
year average percentage change in sales. 
 
 
